2 is a dependable and secure data storage for mobile, wireless networks based on a peer-to-peer paradigm. DS 2 provides support to create and share files under a write-once model, and ensures data confidentiality and dependability by encoding files in a Redundant Residue Number System. The paper analyzes the code efficiency of DS 2 using a set of moduli allowing for efficient encoding and decoding procedures based on single precision arithmetic, and discusses the security issues. The comparison of DS 2 with the Information Dispersal Algorithm approach (IDA) shows that DS 2 features security features which are not provided by IDA, while the two approaches are comparable from the viewpoint of code efficiency and encoding/decoding complexity.
Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networks are composed by a set of mobile hosts (also called mobiles) communicating with each other via radio transceivers. In order to communicate with destinations which are located outside of their transmission ranges or hidden by obstacles, communicating mobiles rely on other mobiles which cooperate to forward messages to their destinations. To this purpose the network layer of the mobiles provides services of message delivery by running suitable routing algorithms [1] , [2] . However, mobility and failures may give rise to network disconnections impairing service dependability.
Due to mobility of nodes, the network topology varies with time. At a given instant of time it is described by a graph where nodes are the mobiles, and a link connecting two nodes in the graph means that the corresponding mobiles can communicate directly.
The mobiles rely on on-board batteries for energy supply, hence energy efficiency of mobiles is an important issue [3] . The effect of battery depletion is similar to a crash fault, from which the mobile may or may not recover depending on the availability of battery replacement/recharge. As mobiles may not be equipped with permanent storage, failures may result in data losses or corruption.
An important issue in mobile ad hoc networks is how to implement dependable and secure data storage. This is an essential requirement in applications where the mobiles cooperate by sharing information and need to create and access shared files. The system should prevent data losses or corruption due to network disconnections, mobile failures or malicious attacks from untrustworthy mobiles, and it should provide the file owners with mechanisms for secure distribution of files access privileges.
Several techniques to implement dependable and/or secure data storage have been proposed in the recent literature [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Some of these, which are based on a clientserver paradigm [4] , [5] , hardly fit the ad hoc network model which is rather based on a peer to peer paradigm. Other approaches are conceived for systems connected with fast, wired networks, where mobility and disconnections of nodes is not supported [6] , or which pay considerable communication overhead to implement a sophisticate model of intrusion tolerance based on user authentication [7] .
Dependable storage systems based on a peer to peer paradigm which may adapt to the ad hoc network model have also been introduced [8] , [9] . They exploit techniques of data fragmentation and dispersal [10] based on erasure codes [11] and use cryptography to achieve data confidentiality.
The technique of data fragmentation and dispersal was originally introduced in [10] , where an information dispersal algorithm (IDA) had been proposed. It exploits erasure codes which are optimal with respect to code efficiency and allows for efficient encoding and decoding procedures.
A new technique to achieve dependable and secure data storage (DS 2 ) in wireless networks has been proposed in [12] . DS 2 exploits Redundant Residue Number System (RRNS) [13] , [14] to encode data, which allows for a uniform coverage of both erasure and errors. RRNS encode data as (h+r)-tuples of residues using h+r keys, or moduli. Residues are distributed among the mobiles in the network. Recovering the original information requires the knowledge of at least h residues and of the corresponding moduli. Data can be reconstructed in the presence of up to s≤r residue losses (erasures), combined with up to 2 s r − corrupted residues. As compared to IDA, DS 2 features basic data confidentiality which is inherently provided by the RRNS encoding. Data confidentiality is ensured since mobiles having access to the residues are able to decode them only if they also know the correspondence of the residues with the set of moduli. [2,h] . Given any non-negative integer X, let x p = X mod m p be the residue of X modulo m p . In the rest of the paper also notation (a) b will also be used to denote a mod b.
The number system representing integers in [0,M) with the (h+r)-tuples of their residues modulo m 1 ,…,m h+r is called the Redundant Residue Number System (RRNS) of moduli m 1 ,…,m h+r , range M and redundancy M R [13] , [14] . For every h+r-tuple (x 1 ,…,x h+r ), the corresponding integer X can be reconstructed by means of the Chinese Remainder Theorem:
where, for each p∈ [1,h] Given an RRNS of range M and redundancy M R , with moduli m 1 ,…,m h+r , let (x 1 ,…, x h+r ) be the legitimate representation of some X in [0,M). An erasure of multiplicity e is an event making unavailable e arbitrary digits in the representation, and an error of multiplicity d is an event transforming d arbitrary, unknown digits. If e+2d≤r then the RRNS can correct the errors to reconstruct X [12] .
Efficient error correcting algorithms are reported in [16] [17] [18] , while an overview on RRNS is available in [19] .
The Dependable and Secure Data Storage for Ad Hoc Networks (DS 2 )
In the Dependable and Secure Data storage for mobile ad hoc networks (DS 2 ) [12] the mobiles cooperate by creating and sharing files. The system provides procedures to create, share and access the files. Once created a file can be written or removed only by its owner (the file creator).
Hereafter we assume that each mobile is assigned with a unique identifier ranging from 0 to n-1, and we will sometimes use the concise notation u i to denote the mobile i.
The file creation procedure exploits an appropriate RRNS to encode a file. To this purpose u i selects a set of h+r moduli (pairwise prime positive integers) m 1 ,…,m h+r with m p >m p-1 for each p∈ [2,h+r] . The moduli are chosen among a set of available moduli computed offline. Since the maximum number which can be represented is limited by the range M=m r+1 ⋅…⋅m h+r of the RRNS, files of sizes exceedingly the range are preliminary partitioned into records b 1 ,…,b s of size b bits each, with 2 b ≤M, and each record is encoded separately.
Record b t is encoded in the RRNS of moduli m 1 ,…,m h+r by the (h+r)-tuple of residues (x t,1 ,…,x t,h+r ). Each residue is sent to a different mobile currently reachable by the file creator, which in turn stores the residue in its storage. The assignment of mobiles to residues is arbitrary with the only constraint that different residues of the same record should be stored in different mobiles. Note that the mobiles storing the residue are not provided with any information about the modulo used to encode that residue.
The file owner maintains a file descriptor containing the set of the moduli used for encoding and s record descriptors. Each record descriptor contains the set of the list mobiles storing the residue digits of the record with the correct association between mobiles and residues. The file descriptor is kept secret by the owner.
Due to the encoding properties, the file records can be read separately. Record reading requires knowledge of correspondence between the mobiles storing the residue and the moduli used to encode the residues. Assuming that a mobile i owns a copy of the file descriptor, it can issue read requests to all the mobiles storing a given record b t . During the read procedure some of the requested residues could be lost during the communication or even could be corrupted before reaching i. Once u i receives a sufficient number of residues, it executes the decoding procedure based on the Chinese Reminder Theorem. If no residues are corrupted the decoding procedure returns the value of b t , otherwise u i will attempt to recover from the corrupted residues. In general, the original content of record b t can be recovered only if the residues are decoded with the correct moduli and the multiplicity of the erasures e and of the errors d is such that 2d+e≤r.
File sharing is enabled by the file owner by distributing encrypted replicas of the file descriptor to trusted mobiles. In DS 2 it is assumed that mobiles sharing a file are not allowed to distribute the file descriptor to other mobiles, nor to write or remove the file. Since it is assumed that the mobiles sharing the file are trusted by the file owner, DS 2 does not employ any mechanism to inhibit distribution of descriptors. The policy of denying write and remove privileges is enforced by the mobiles hosting the residue digits. Failure to enforce this policy is equivalent to malicious digit corruption by the hosts.
The reader is referred to [12] for an extensive presentation of the DS 2 . To improve the performance of the encoding/decoding procedures, we select the set of moduli such that most of the operations can be performed using single precision arithmetic. To this purpose we constructed a library of 45 moduli which is shown in Table 1 . The largest modulo m 1 is 2 16 , and all the other moduli have been chosen as close as possible to 2 16 , with the constraint that the moduli must be pairwise prime. Consider the Residue Number System with no redundancy (thus r=0) of the first h moduli of Table 1 , and let M= m 1 ⋅…⋅m h be its range and M b 2 log = . Assume that record b t (t∈ [1,s] ) is in the range [0,2 b ) (it can be represented with b bits), and b t is encoded into the set of residues x t,1 ,…,x t,h where residue x t,p (p∈ [1,h] ) is encoded with 16 bits. Hence the entire record is encoded in e=16h bits.
The code efficiency is defined as the ratio ϕ=b/e. The code efficiency of encoding with the first h moduli in the library of Table 1 Under the latter assumption, Figure 1a depicts the code efficiency in terms of the ratio ϕ=b'/e for different values of h. It is seen that, as h increases, the difference between b' and e remains constant while b' and e increase, and hence the code efficiency also increases. We now evaluate the code efficiency using r>0 redundant moduli. Let us consider the RRNS of the first h+r moduli of Table 1 . Since the redundant moduli should be larger than the non-redundant ones, the range is given by M=m r ⋅…⋅m h+r , and and M b 2 log = . Record b t (t∈ [1,s] ) is encoded into the set of residues x t,1 ,…,x t,h+r , where x t,p (p∈ [1,h+r] ) has length 16 bits, and the length of the encoded record is e=16(h+r). Assuming that the length of the record, prior to residue encoding is aligned to the byte, and defining b'=16h-8. as above, the code efficiency ϕ=b'/e has been evaluated for r∈ [1, 10] and h∈ [1, 35] . As shown in Figure 1b the code efficiency increases rapidly for h<10, after which it asymptotically approaches h/(h+r). Given an RRNS of the first h+r moduli m 1 ,…,m h+r of Table 1 and range M=m r ⋅…⋅m h+r , consider now the complexity of the procedure of residue encoding of an integer X in the range [0,M). X is expanded as:
The encoding procedure computes residues x 1 ,…,x h+r , where residue
each i∈ [1,h+r] . For the ease of notation, let m=m i , δ=δ i for some i∈ [1,h+r] . From (1) and m=2 l -δ follows that The values of (δ i ) m can be computed offline and stored with the moduli in the library of Table 1 : this requires storing 4h single precision integers for each modulo. It is immediate from (2) that the computation of each residue requires at most h multiplications mod m and h-1 additions mod m, that is, 2h single precision integer multiplications and 4h+2h-2=6h-2 single precision integer additions in the worst case.
In order to evaluate the complexity of decoding, assume without loss of generality that h+t (0≤t≤r) residues x 1 ,…,x h+t from the encoding of a given record are received correctly, and let M′=m 1 ⋅…⋅ m h+t . Then 
Security Issues in DS 2
Confidentiality, authenticity and availability are among the classical security requirements. Confidentiality implies that only authorised users should be able to read a message; integrity implies that not authorized users are unable to modify a message, and the availability requirement consists in the protocol capacity to detect and resist to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In the following we analyse the compliance of DS 2 to such requirements. Confidentiality -To recover a single record encoded into h+r residues by DS 2 (where h is the number of non-redundant moduli and r is the number of redundant moduli), an attacker must know the nodes on which the residues of the record are stored and the correspondence between each residue and the appropriate modulo. Further, the residues of a record do not provide information about the record content. More specifically a record can be successfully read only if the multiplicity of the erasures e and of the errors d is such that 2d+e≤r and the correspondence between available residues and the moduli is known. Under these assumptions the record content can be recovered using using the Chinese Reminder Theorem. We are unaware of any efficient method to perform decoding which does not use the Chinese Reminder Theorem. However, the record can still be recovered by a brute force attack.
We evaluate the complexity of a brute force attack to decode the information of a record in the case in which h+t correct residues {x 1 ,…,x h+t } are known. In principle an attacker may not know the values of h and r, however these indexes could be easily guessed by the attacker as the number of reasonable combinations is extremely limited, for this reason we assume that also h and r are known.
The attacker should consider all the possible h+t-tuples of residues in association with all the permutations of the h+r available moduli (which are public), and look for one combination leading to a legitimate number. Note that it is possible that several combinations lead to wrong legitimate numbers, but we disregard this possibility to the advantage of the attacker. It is then easy to see that the number of possible combinations is given by
It should be considered however that the attacker has the additional advantage that the DS 2 encoding is error correcting. Hence for each combination it could execute the error correction procedure and look for the correct combination of at least 2 / t h + moduli and residues. Note that applying the error correcting procedure would increase the workaround factor required by the attacker to break the confidentiality, however in the following, we do not take into consideration such a factor. Hence, the resulting analysis is a lower bound on the efforts required to the attacker to break the confidentiality of the scheme for this type of attack. Note that, taking into account the possibility for the attacker to exploit the error correcting features of the RRNS, the number of combinations in Equation ( , where, for each k, the first factor accounts for all the possible combinations of k residues associated with the wrong moduli, and the second factor accounts for all the possible association of these residues with all the moduli which are not correctly assigned.
From Figure 2 , which shows the value
for r=8, t=4, and h∈ [10, 35] and the factorial of h, it is seen that the logarithm of the number of combinations C grows as the logarithm of h!.
As an alternative, the attacker may generate all the possible integers in the range [0,M) and encode each integer using the set of available moduli, until it finds an integer X whose encoding produces a set of residues which includes the set {x 1 ,…,x h+t } of the received residues. It should be observed that this condition is not sufficient to guarantee that X equals the original encoded information, however we disregard this possibility to the advantage of the attacker. It is immediate that, disregarding the complexity of encoding, this procedure has complexity O(M). This leads to a complexity of about O(2 16(h+r) ), which however, considering the encoding with the moduli library of Table 1 , results less efficient than the technique discussed above.
In principle a record could be reconstructed also by a mobile which has somehow received at least t<h residue digits. Since the correspondence of residue digits with the moduli is unknown to the malicious mobile, it should then consider all possible ttuples of residues in association with all permutations of the h+r available moduli. Assuming that the correct association of a t-tuple of residues with the t moduli is somehow guessed, the decoding procedure only yield an integer which is congruent to the record. The record could be recovered by adding some (unknown) multiple of the product of some of the additional moduli.
Decoding the residues in this way leads to many legitimate numbers, and it may be very difficult to determine the right one. If the records are plain ASCII encoding, a clue may be provided by the fact that most legitimate numbers do not correspond to ASCII encoding, on the other hand, to save wireless bandwidth and mobiles storage, the encoding and dispersal of the file is most likely preceded by file compression and hence DS 2 generally operates on binary files. Integrity -We consider any attempt of a malicious mobile to modify a record. Note that the resilience to this type of attack is independent whether the modification is meaningful or not, that is, the attacker tries to modify the record in such a way that the resulting record has a different, meaningful information content, or the attacker randomly modifies the record, which is (wrongly) recognised as a correct one by the legitimate requester, despite its information content.
With the DS 2 encoding, malicious corruptions of residues can be recovered if h+t (t≤r) residues can be read and no more than 2 / t residues are corrupted, and can be detected if the number of corrupted residues does not exceed t. This feature of DS 2 is an improvement with respect to the behaviour of recent standard protocols, which are subject to this type of threat, as in [21] . Availability -For every read operation, the disruption of up to r residues of a record do not compromise the capability recovering the record. Moreover, if the residues are routed through paths which have minimal intersection points (the ideal situation would be to have disjoint paths), the probability of DS 2 to be resilient to a DoS attack enhances dramatically. Indeed, for the attacker to be successful, it should take control of at least r+1 different specific nodes, each one being on one of the disjoint paths.
As a final remark, we note there is a number of little security flaws to which DS 2 is exposed, but which can be easily circumvented. For example, if the encoding produces a residue containing the value 65535, it is immediate that this residue must correspond to modulo m 0 =65536. Also, the encoding of a record whose decimal content is smaller than any module of the RRNS yields residues whose content is the same as the original record. These little flaws can be easily prevented, for example by selecting a random constant (to be kept secretly in the file descriptor) to be added modulo 65536 to each residue after the encoding.
Comparison of DS 2 with Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA)
We now compare DS 2 with the Rabin's Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [10] . To this purpose we briefly review IDA.
Let us consider a file f composed by N characters b 1 ,…,b N where each b i is in the range [0,B), and let p be a prime with p>B. Typical values of B and p are B=256 and p=257. As in DS 2 the file encoding produces h+r fragments to be dispersed in the network, and the file content can be reconstructed from any h fragments.
Let us assume for the sake of simplicity that N=(h+r)h. To the purpose of encoding, IDA partitions the file in h+r records S 1 ,…,S h+r , each of h characters, that is, S i =(b h(i-1)+1 ,…,b ih ) for each i∈ [1,h+r] . Then it selects a h+r-tuple (a 1 ,…,a h+r ) of h+r randomly chosen vectors such that a i =(a i1 ,…,a ih ), a i,j ∈[0,p), and any subset of h vectors is linearly independent.
The encoding produces h+r fragments F 1 ,…,F h+r each of size h+r characters, where F i =(c i1 ,…,c ih+r ) and c ik =(a i ×S k ) mod p for each i,k∈ [1,h+r] .
Note that the characters of the fragments F 1 ,…,F h+r are in the range [0,p), while the characters of the file are in the range [0,B) with B<p. This in general leads to a wastage of at least 1 bit per character, however with a simple technique [10] this overhead can be avoided.
The decoding procedure of IDA requires at least h fragments of the encoded file. Assume that F 1 ,…,F h , are available, the file can be reconstructed as follows. Let A be the h×h matrix whose ith row is a i . Then record S k is given by: [10, 45] and record size b'=16h-8, and (b) r∈ [1, 10] , h∈ [1, 35] , and record size b'=16h-8. Number of combinations C to be analyzed in case of brute force attack compared with h! (r=8, t=4, and h∈ [10, 35] ).
